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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ARLENE NOLEN 
Petitioner / Appellant, 
Vs. 
JUDY HAMAKER-MANN, Director, 
Utah State Driver's License Division, 
Respondent / Appellee. 
Case No. 20050877 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Nolen appeals from a district court order denying her Petition for 
Judicial Review of Suspension of Driver License and affirming the Department of Public 
Safety's (Department) decision revoking her driver's license for 18 months. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-
3(2)(a) and 78-2a-3(2)(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Trial Court made the correct decision in 
concluding that there was sufficient evidence to show that the behavior of the Petitioner 
clearly indicated, judged objectively, that the Petitioner intended to refuse to take the 
intoxilyzer test. 
Standard of Review: Correction-of-error standard. This Court reviews a Trial 
Court's conclusions of law under a correction-of-error standard. Brinkerhoffv. 
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
An interpretation is necessary of the following Statutes and Regulations in 
determining the definition of a "refusal" as it pertains to an intoxilyzer test, because they 
are determinative of the appeal and are of central importance to the appeal: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (2004)1 in relevant part: 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by a 
peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection 
(1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be 
warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to 
the test or tests can result in revocation of the personfs license to operate a motor 
vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not 
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered, a peace officer shall, on behalf of the Driver License Division and 
within 24 hours of the arrest, give notice of the Driver License Division's intention 
to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was 
requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or 
tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver License Division as required 
in the notice, the Driver 
License Division shall revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor 
vehicle in Utah beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) applies; 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (2004) in relevant part: 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
1
 Since this case, the Legislature as renumbered the DUI Statutes to Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-501 et seq. Ail 
references are made to the law as numbered at the time of the Trial. 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person 
was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This case involves an alleged refusal of an Intoxilyzer test by the Petitioner. The 
Petitioner was arrested for DUI and was asked to submit to an Intoxilyzer breath test. 
The Petitioner submitted to an Intoxilyzer breath test with a result of. 157. However, the 
machine reported an insufficient sample code. The officer marked the Petitioner down as 
a refusal, rather than a "Per Se" violation of the DUI statute. 
The Course of Proceedings: 
The Petitioner made a timely filing for a Driver License Review Hearing with the 
Department of Public Safety. R. 052. The Department of Public Safety scheduled and 
held an administrative hearing on the issue of the Petitioner's refusal to take an 
intoxilyzer test. R.05. The issue of a 90 day suspension was not heard because the Police 
officer did not mark the correct box for the "Per Se" issues to be heard. R.T. 01. The 
Department of Public Safety made the decision to revoke and/or suspend the Petitioner's 
Driver's License for a period of 18 months after the hearing, which was effective 
December 15, 2004. R. 05. The Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Judicial Review of 
Suspension of Driver's License on December 22, 2004. R. 01-06. The Court granted the 
Petitioner's Motion to Stay State's Suspension of the Petitioner's Driver License. R. 07-
2
 The Trial Court did not mark the Transcript or reference the Transcript on the Judgment Roll and Index. The 
Appellant has used the R.T. reference to indicate Record Transcript. 
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08. The matter was heard in an evidentiary trial before the Honorable Judge Kay in the 
Second District Court, of and for Davis County, in the Layton Department. R.T. 1-64 
and R. 27-31. 
The Disposition of the Trial Court: 
The Trial Court, after hearing the evidence, denied the Petitioner's Petition and 
affirmed the Department Of Public Safety's decision to suspend the Petitioner's driver's 
license for a period of 18 months. R. 27-31. The suspension was stayed pending the 
outcome of this Appeal. R. 31. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 5, 2004, the Petitioner was pulled over by an officer for allegedly 
driving to close to the curb and making lane changes too abruptly. Officer Parkin 
conducted field sobriety tests and concluded in his opinion that the Petitioner was 
impaired. The Petitioner, through her attorney, stipulated that the officer gave her proper 
service of the Notice and Citation and that the officer had probable cause to arrest. R. T: 
2-3. Prior to arresting the Petitioner for DUI, Officer Parkin asked the Petitioner to blow 
into a portable breath machine. R.T:3. The Petitioner was unable to provide a long and 
consistent breath of air that was required to have the portable breath tester measure a 
result. R.T.: 4. The Petitioner had a tongue ring in her mouth at the time she blew into 
the portable breath test which the officer did not have her remove. R.T. 13. 
The Petitioner was then arrested. R.T.:4 The Petitioner's mouth was checked 
pursuant to the officer's procedures and the so-called Baker Rule at 23:42, and the officer 
had the Petitioner remove her tongue piercing at that time. R.T. 4. The officer then read 
the Petitioner the first Chemical test admonition that asks her whether or not she 
understood she was being arrested for DUI. The Petitioner responded "Okay." R.T. 5. 
The Officer then read The Petitioner the second admonition and requested the Petitioner 
to submit to the breath test. R.T.6. The Petitioner responded by saying "yeah, but what if 
I don't?" R.T.6. The officer then read the Petitioner the refusal admonition and indicated 
that if she refused to take the test, her license would be revoked for 18 months for a first 
refusal or 24 months for a second refusal. R.T.6. The Petitioner responded by saying 
"okay" and then asked if she could call Hans first, which was a friend of hers. R.T.7. 
The officer then read the admonition as it pertains to her right to counsel. R.T.7. At that 
point in time, the Petitioner agreed to take the breath test. R.T.7. The Petitioner then 
attempted the breath test. R.T.8. The Petitioner had problems blowing into the machine. 
The Petitioner attempted to blow into the machine several times and was unable to 
provide a sufficient sample of breath. R.T.8-9. The machine printed out a result of a 
Breath Alcohol Content of .157. R.T. 14-15, Exhibit 1. The machine printed a code of 
insufficient sample. Exhibit 1. 
The Petitioner has had a problem with anxiety for a long time and is treated 
medically for anxiety. R.T. 39. The Petitioner is prescribed Adavan for her anxiety 
disorder. R.T. 39. As the Petitioner blew into the machine, she was really scared and 
was trying to breath in, suck in air, and blow it out, but she could not maintain a long 
exhale of air to blow into the machine because she was scared and nervous. R.T. 40. The 
Petitioner had never seen this machine before and had no experience in blowing into this 
machine. R.T. 40. The Petitioner was unable to suck in enough air to blow into the 
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machine. R.T.41. When the officer told the Petitioner that he was going to mark her 
down as a refusal, the Petitioner immediately asked the officer if she could try it again. 
R.T. 41. The officer did not allow her to do the test again. R.T. 41. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Petitioner was asked to perform an intoxilyzer test. The Petitioner agreed to 
do the test three times. The Petitioner never verbally refused the test. Therefore, the 
Court was required to look at the Petitioner's behavior to determine if that behavior 
clearly indicates, judged objectively, that the Petitioner intended to refuse to take the test. 
The Petitioner's behavior indicates that she made every effort to take the breath test. The 
Petitioner verbally indicated that she would take the test. The Petitioner attempted the 
portable breath test. The Petitioner then attempted the intoxilyzer test. On both tests, the 
Petitioner was unable to produce an adequate breath sample. However, the intoxilyzer 
did measure her breath sample at a breath alcohol content of .157. Therefore, by Exhibit 
1 alone, the Petitioner did not refuse to take this test. When the officer indicated that he 
was going to consider this a refusal, the Petitioner asked the officer if she could try again. 
The officer said no. The Petitioner indicated that because of her anxiety and nervousness, 
she was having a hard time breathing enough air in to blow into the machine. From an 
objective standpoint, the Petitioner's behavior did not clearly indicate that the Petitioner 
intended to refuse to take the intoxilyzer test. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PETITIONER'S BEHAVIOR DID NOT CLEARLY INDICATE, 
JUDGED OBJECTIVELY, THAT THE PETITIONER INTENDED TO 
REFUSE TO TAKE THE BREATH TEST 
I. THE RESPONDENT'S BEHAVIOR DID NOT SHOW THAT THE PETITIONER 
INTENDED TO REFUSE THE BREATH TEST 
The Law in Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (2004), requires that if a citizen is 
asked to give a breath test and refuses to do so, the officer must first warn the citizen that 
she will lose her license. Then if the person invokes her right to speak with an attorney, 
the officer is then required to explain to the citizen that her right to an attorney does not 
apply to the intoxilyzer test. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (2004), requires that an 
administrative hearing be conducted to determine whether the person refused to take a 
chemical test. 
In this case, the Petitioner was scared, suffered from an anxiety disorder, and was 
asking simple questions to understand what the officer explained to her. Rather than take 
the time to explain the admonitions to the Petitioner, the officer simply kept reading 
admonitions to the Petitioner. The Petitioner, at each stage, never verbally refused to 
take the breath test. Even though the Petitioner would ask questions, the Petitioner 
verbally agreed to take the breath test. Therefore, the Trial Court was left with making a 
determination as to whether the Petitioner refused to take the breath test by her conduct. 
A. THE PETITIONER'S CONDUCT WAS AMBIGUOUS AT BEST 
The Trial Court, in making its decision, relied upon Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 
(Utah 1979). R.T. 58. Holman involves a driver that was confused between his Miranda 
rights and the admonitions. The Supreme Court ultimately held that "there was sufficient 
evidence to support the finding of a refusal to take the test. However, the judgment of the 
revocation must be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for additional 
findings with respect to the issue of the clarity with which the appellant was instructed as 
to his obligations and rights." Id. at 1334-1335. 
In discussing whether a person refuses the breath test, the Court in Holman stated 
"Obviously the arresting officer cannot know the subjective state of mind of the person 
arrested and whether he in fact intended his response to a request to take a blood test to 
be the equivalent of a refusal that would result in license revocation. The test must be 
objective; otherwise the whole statutory scheme could be subverted by one who 
equivocates or remains silent, and later protests that it was his unexpressed intent to take 
the test. However, the behavior of the driver must clearly indicate, judged objectively, 
that the driver intended to refuse to take the test"' Id. at 1333 {Emphasis added). 
This is the language that the Trial Court in the case at hand relied upon. The Trial 
Court admitted that this was a close case. R.T. 61, 63. The Trial Court, in making its 
findings, found that the Petitioner agreed to take the portable breath test and that the 
Petitioner could not produce enough breath to measure a result on that test. R.T. 59 and 
R. 29-30. The Court found that the Petitioner responded to the request to take a breath 
test with an agreement to take the test, but also asked the question of the officer, "what 
happens if I don't." R.T. 59. The Officer gave the Petitioner another warning, and the 
Petitioner agreed to take the breath test but asked if she could call a friend first. R.T. 59. 
The Petitioner agreed to take the test, and she did blow into the machine. R.T. 59, 
Exhibit 1. The Court then found that the Petitioner made no verbal statements to the 
officer that she is having problems breathing into the machine. R.T. 59-60 and R. 30-31. 
There was testimony that the Petitioner was scared and the officer agreed that she looked 
scared. R.T. 60. The Court found that the Petitioner had problems with anxiety and was 
prescribed medication for anxiety. R.T.60. The Petitioner also testified that she could 
not suck in enough air to blow into the machine. R.T. 60. The evidence showed that the 
machine did in fact print out a breath alcohol content result of. 157. Exhibit 1. The 
evidence also showed that when the officer told the Petitioner he was marking her down 
as a refusal, she implored the officer to allow her to try again and the officer would not 
allow her to try again. R.T. 41. The Petitioner did not know that her breath sample was 
insufficient and that she was not providing enough air until the officer told her she was 
being marked down as a refusal. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in stating, "Clearly the loss of 
driving privileges is a severe deprivation that may have serious consequences for an 
individual, not the least of which is the possible loss of employment. Accordingly, it is 
important that a law enforcement officer make a determination that a motorist has refused 
to take a test on the basis of conduct which clearly indicates a volitional refusal with an 
understanding of the consequences that follow upon a refusal." Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 
1335, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
9 
Here, a woman was first asked to take a portable breath test. She does everything 
the officer asks of her that night. She completely cooperates with every request that the 
officer makes. The officer asks the Petitioner to blow into the portable breath test. She 
does that. She is unable to produce enough air to get a measured result on that portable 
breath test. That should have been the first indication to the officer that the Petitioner 
may be incapable of blowing into a machine to provide the required amount of air to be 
measured on the intoxilyzer. The Petitioner is then requested to take an intoxilyzer test. 
The Petitioner verbally agrees to take the test. The Petitioner is asked to remove tongue 
jewelry from her mouth prior to blowing into the machine. The Petitioner, blows into the 
machine. The machine gives a result of .157 breath alcohol content. The machine then 
tells the officer that the sample was insufficient. Upon learning that the sample was 
insufficient, rather than have the Petitioner do the test again, the officer marks the 
Petitioner down as a refusal. 
The Trial Court said that this was a close case. R.T. 61, 63. The Petitioner 
contends that the Trial Court did not make the correct ruling of law and erred in denying 
the Petitioner's Petition. At best, the Petitioner's behavior was ambiguous. The standard 
requires a clear indication that that the Petitioner intended to refuse the test. 
B. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWED THAT THE PETITIONER INTENDED TO 
TAKE THE TEST 
The last sentence of the standard and the test is, "did the behavior of the Petitioner 
clearly indicate, judged objectively, that the Petitioner intended to refuse to take the 
test?" See, Holman at 1333, (emphasis added). Even looking at the Trial Court's 
findings, the evidence clearly indicates that the Petitioner intended to take the intoxilzyer 
test. The Petitioner verbally agreed to take the test. The Petitioner never remained silent 
about the test. The Petitioner asked questions when taking the test. The Petitioner's 
behavior demonstrates that the Petitioner blew into the machine and intended to take the 
test. The evidence showed that the Petitioner put her mouth on the mouth piece. The 
evidence showed that the Petitioner was blowing into the machine. The machine itself 
indicated that the Petitioner's behavior indicated that the Petitioner intended to take the 
test by registering a result. The only evidence that the Court relies upon to indicate that 
the Petitioner did not intend to take the breath test is that she questioned the officer about 
taking the test and that she never gave any verbal comments that she was having trouble 
breathing. The Court placed the standard and burden on the Petitioner's shoulders to 
show that she clearly intended to take the test rather than looking at the objective 
behavior of the Petitioner to determine whether she clearly intended to refuse the test. 
Suppose a person is asked to give a urine sample, and suppose the person cannot 
produce a urine sample because of the stress the person is under or the person just cannot 
urinate. Does justice require, because of the person's inability to give a sample of urine 
at no fault of his or her own, that the person's driver license be suspended for a period of 
18 months? 
Suppose a person is asked to give a blood sample and the person's vein folds and 
it is not possible to get an adequate sample of blood. Does justice require, because of the 
person's inability to give a sample of blood at no fault of his or her own, that the person's 
driver license be suspended for a period of 18 months? 
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Suppose a person, because of their physiological makeup, cannot produce enough 
air to meet the requirements of a sufficient sample. Suppose a person is nervous and has 
problems sucking in enough air to blow into the machine. Does justice require, because 
of the person's inability to give a sample of air at no fault of his or her own, that the 
person's driver license be suspended for a period of 18 months? 
Even though the Petitioner was not able to give a sample of air in the quantity 
required by the intoxilzyer, the intoxilyer produced a result. The Petitioner did 
everything she could do to cooperate with the officer's requests. The officer has other 
options if one test is not available or he is unable to obtain a sufficient sample. The 
officer could have requested the Petitioner to take an alternative test pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §41 -6-44.10(1 )(b) (2004), which states, "The police officer determines which 
of the tests are administered and how many of them are administered." 
The Petitioner, Arlene Nolen, did not refuse to take the intoxilyzer test. The 
Petitioner took the test, a result was printed, and the officer in his discretion called it a 
refusal. Once the Petitioner was informed that she did not put enough air into the 
machine, the Petitioner requested to try again, but the officer denied her request. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument and the record submitted to the Court, the 
Petitioner respectfully requests the Court to reverse the Trial Court's Order denying the 
Petition. The Petitioner made every effort to take the intoxilyzer test. When she was 
informed that the test had an error, the Petitioner implored the officer to allow her to try 
again. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The Appellant requests oral argument in this matter pursuant to Rule 29(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is a matter raises several important issues in 
defining legislative statutes, and it is the position of the Appellant that the court could be 
significantly aided in its decision process by oral argument from the parties. 
Respectfully submitted this <^7 day of A)oU*^U^ 2005. 
GEEN-W^EELEY 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Statutes of Central Importance 
§41-6-44.10 
Utah Statutes 
Title 41 - Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 06 - Traffic Rules and Regulations 
41-6-44.10 Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug - Number of tests - Refusal - Warning, 
report - Hearing, revocation of license -- Appeal - Person incapable of refusal - Results of test available 
- Who may give test - Evidence. 
41-6-44.10 Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Number of tests — Refusal — 
Warning, report — Hearing, revocation of license — Appeal — Person incapable of refusal — 
Results of test available — Who may give test - Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given the person's 
consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath, blood, urine, or oral fluids for the purpose of 
determining whether the person was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-
232, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under 
Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are administered at 
the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited 
under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered and how many of them are 
administered. 
(ii) If a peace officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to take one or more requested 
tests, even though the person does submit to any other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this 
section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a chemical test or tests of the 
person's breath, blood, or urine, or oral fluids may not select the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical test is not a defense 
to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or 
administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by a peace officer to 
submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any 
chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a 
refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's license to operate a motor 
vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not immediately request that 
the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, a peace officer shall, on behalf of 
the Driver License Division and within 24 hours of the arrest, give notice of the Driver License 
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. When a peace 
officer gives the notice on behalf of the Driver License Division, the peace officer shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of arrest; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, basic information 
regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by the Driver License 
Division, also serve as the temporary license certificate. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed report, within ten calendar days 
after the day on which notice is provided under Subsection (2)(b), that the peace officer had grounds to 
believe the arrested person had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-
232, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under 
Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused to 
submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke the 
person's license under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten calendar days after the day on 
which notice is provided. 
(iii) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, the Driver License Division 
shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the Driver License Division under this 
Subsection (2)(e), the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked beginning on 
the 30th day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of arrest 
under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or 
(II) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of arrest 
under Section 41-6-44. 
(f) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(f)(ii), if a hearing is requested by the person, the hearing 
shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in the county in which the offense occurred. 
(ii) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other county if the Driver License 
Division and the person both agree. 
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was operating a motor 
vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44,41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test. 
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in 
accordance with the rates established in Section 78-46-28. 
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was requested to submit 
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before 
the Driver License Division as required in the notice, the Driver 
License Division shall revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah 
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of arrest 
under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or 
(II) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of arrest 
under Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed 
under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's 
driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision following a 
proceeding allowed under this Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper. 
(j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under this section 
may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the district court in 
the county in which the offense occurred. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering the person incapable 
of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the consent 
provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be administered whether the person has been 
arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or tests shall be made 
available to the person. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-
30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug 
content. This limitation does not apply to taking a urine, breath, or oral fluid specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30 
who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer 
has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which the 
sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the 
test is administered according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at the person's own expense, have a physician of the person's 
own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered at the direction of a 
peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the results of 
the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken 
at the direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace 
officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or tests, the person to be 
tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, physician, or other person 
present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or any additional test under 
this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising 
out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, combination of alcohol and any drug, 
or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body. 
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(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be violating or has 
violated Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the operation of a vehicle with a certain blood or breath alcohol 
concentration and driving under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or combination of a drug and alcohol 
or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, the peace officer may, in connection with arresting the 
person, request that the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be administered in compliance with 
the standards under Section 41-6-44.10. 
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6-44 includes any similar local ordinance adopted in 
compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1). 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to a chemical test that a 
test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6 shall, and the existence of a blood 
alcohol content sufficient to render the person incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in 
suspension or revocation of the person's license to drive a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a blood or breath alcohol 
content in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6, or if a peace officer makes a determination, based 
on reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise in violation of Section 41-6-44, a peace officer shall, 
on behalf of the division and within 24 hours of arrest, give notice of the division's intention to suspend 
the person's license to drive a motor vehicle. 
(4) (a) When a peace officer gives notice on behalf of the division, the peace officer shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the driver; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of arrest; and 
(iii) supply to the driver, in a manner specified by the division, basic information regarding how to 
obtain a prompt hearing before the division. 
(b) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by the division, also 
serve as the temporary license certificate. 
(5) As a matter of procedure, a peace officer shall send to the division within ten calendar days after 
the day on which notice is provided: 
(a) the person's license certificate; 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed report in a manner specified by the division indicating the chemical test results, if any; 
and 
(d) any other basis for the peace officer's determination that the person has violated Section 41-6-44 
or 41-6-44.6. 
(6) (a) Upon request in a manner specified by the division, the division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request to be heard shall be made 
within ten calendar days of the day on which notice is provided under Subsection (5). 
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b)(ii), a hearing, if held, shall be before the division in 
the county in which the arrest occurred. 
(ii) The division may hold a hearing in some other county if the division and the person both agree. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving a motor vehicle 
in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers; or 
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in accordance with 
the rates established in Section 78-46-28. 
(e) The division may designate one or more employees to conduct the hearing. 
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before any designated employee is as valid as if made by the 
division. 
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a motor vehicle is 
suspended or not. 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held fails to appear before the division as required in the 
notice, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a motor vehicle is suspended or not. 
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this Subsection (7), is for a 
period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the date of the arrest. 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years 
under this Subsection (7) is for a period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest. 
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 
53-3-205(13) for driving under the influence, a fee under Section 53-3-105 to cover administrative costs, 
which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated. This fee shall be cancelled if the 
person obtains an unappealed division hearing or court decision that the suspension was not proper. 
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under this section may file a petition 
within 30 days after the suspension for a hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed by Section 53-
3-224. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE NOLEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JUDY HAMAKER-MANN, Director, 
Utah State Driver's License Division, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 040604864 AA 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This matter came before the Court for a trial de novo on March 11, 2005, the Honorable 
Thomas L. Kay presiding. The Petitioner and her counsel, Glen W. Neeley, appeared. Respondent 
appeared through counsel Rebecca D. Waldron, Assistant Attorney General. The Court, having 
heard and considered the evidence, stipulations of the parties and arguments presented at the hearing, 
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, enters the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order iiiiiiiii 
FILED 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 5,2004, Officer Davis observed a vehicle driving erratically on Hill Field 
Road. He observed the vehicle traveling in or near the gutter. The vehicle got into the turn lane and 
then abruptly turned into the gutter again. Officer Davis initiated a traffic stop and called Officer 
Parkin to assist. 
2. The driver of the vehicle was Petitioner. Officer Parkin detected an odor of alcohol 
coming from Petitioner's breath. The officer asked her to submit to field sobriety tests. The Parties 
stipulated that results of the field sobriety tests established cognitive and motor skill impairment. 
3. Petitioner was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
4. Officer Parkin read Petitioner the required chemical test admonitions verbatim as they 
appear on the DUI report form, and asked Petitioner if she understood that she was arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of a controlled 
substance or metabolite in her body. Petitioner responded, "okay." 
5. Officer Parkin requested that Petitioner submit to a breath test. Petitioner was informed 
of the consequences of a test result which indicates an unlawful amount of alcohol and/or drugs or 
metabolite in her body. Petitioner responded, "yeah, but what if I don't?" 
6. Officer Parkin then read Petitioner the refusal admonition which warned her that if she 
refused the test or failed to follow the Officer's instructions, her driving privilege may be revoked 
for 18 months for a first refusal or 24 months for a subsequent refusal with no provision for limited 
driving. Petitioner responded, "okay," but asked to call Hans first. 
2 
7. Officer Parker then read Petitioner the last admonition that informed Petitioner that 
her right to remain silent and her right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law, which 
is civil in nature and separate from the criminal charges. The Officer had her remove a tongue 
piercing before taking the test. He did not know how old the wound was. He observed that she 
looked scared, but saw no outward signs of breathing difficulties, slurred speech, or any other 
evidence that she had a hard time breathing. He observed that she appeared to be spitting into the 
machine at first. The portable breath test was attempted, but she did not provide a sufficient 
sample. The highest value obtained with the insufficient sample was a BA .157. 
8. Petitioner made no verbal statements to the arresting officer that she was anxious, 
nervous, or any other statements that she was having trouble breathing. 
9. Petitioner asked Officer Parkin if she could take the test again, Officer Parker said no. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
1. Officer Parkin had probable cause to arrest Petitioner for driving under the influence 
of alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-44 (2004), based upon the stipulations of the 
parties regarding the results of the field sobriety tests. 
2. Petitioner refused to take the requested breath test after being informed of the 
consequences of a refusal. Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1979), states that in order 
to form the basis for revocation of operator's license for refusal to take a chemical test, "the behavior 
of the driver must clearly indicate, judged objectively, that the driver intended to refuse to take the 
test." Petitioner's actual behavior that was testified to is as follows: 
a. Petitioner agreed to take the portable breath test, but she did not give a sufficient breath 
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sample to get a result. 
b. Petitioner's response to the officer's request to take the Intoxilyzer test was "What happens 
if I don't?" 
c. Petitioner was given the refusal admonition, which informed her of the consequences if 
she does not take the breath test. She agreed to take the breath test. However, during the test, 
Petitioner appeared to be spitting at first, then she blew into the machine, but failed to give a 
sufficient sample ofhamJ Petitioner makes no verbal statements that she's having trouble breathing, 
or that she's anxious, nervous, or any other statements indicating that she is having trouble breathing. 
d. There is testimony that Petitioner was scared. The arresting officer said she looked scared, 
but he testified that Petitioner looked normal for the situation, and that her breathing appeared 
normal. Petitioner testified that she had problems with anxiety and that she was taking Adavan. She 
said she wasn't freaking out, but was scared, and that she could not suck in air. Petitioner asked to 
do the test again. The arresting officer testified that he saw no sucking in air or any other trouble 
breathing. 
The most crucial facts are that Petitioner made no verbal statements to the arresting officer 
regarding Petitioner having trouble breathing, and there were no outward signs of Petitioner having 
breathing difficulty. There was no evidence that Petitioner had a hard time breathing. The 
credibility of the officer out weighs the Petitioner's in regards to Petitioner's claim that she was 
sucking in air. Petitioner's behavior clearly indicated, judged objectively, that she intended to refuse 
to take the test. 
3. Officer Parkin properly served Petitioner with a copy of the DUI summons and Citation 
which gave Petitioner notice of the Driver License Division's intent to revoke her driving privilege. 
4 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Ms. Nolan's petition is denied. 
2. The January 11, 2005 Order to Stay the Suspension of Petitioner's Driver License 
remains in affect during the appeal of this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals as of the date of this 
Order. 
3. The revocation of Petitioner's driving privilege for a period of eighteen months, effective 
December, 14, 2004 is affirmed. . 
DATED this of Almost; 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Thomdhi. Kay 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Attorne 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, postage prepaid, on this JJ_ day of August, 2005, 
to the 
following: 
Glen W. Neeley 
Attorney at Law 
863 E. 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
y^^ry 
ADDENDUM C 
Minutes Bench Trial 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT- LAYTON COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARLENE NOLEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs 
JUDY HAMAKER-MANN, 
Respondent. 
MINUTES 
BENCH TRIAL 
Case No: 040604864 AA 
Judge: THOMAS L KAY 
Date: March 11, 2005 
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Petitioner's Attorney: GLEN W NEELEY 
Petitioner(s): ARLENE NOLEN 
Attorney for the Respondent: REBECCA D WALDRON 
Video 
Tape Number: 3/11/2005 Tape Count: 1002 
TRIAL 
Opening statement 
Stipulation to field test 
Officer Parkin sworn and testified 
Defendant exhibit 1 offered and received 
Motion for directed verdict by Mr. Neeley 
Response Ms. Waldron 
Response Mr. Neeley 
Court rules on motion for directed verdict - DENIED 
Petitioner Arlene Nolen sworn and testified 
No XEM 
Recall Officer Parkin 
Closing Ms. Waldron 
Closing Mr. Neeley 
Rebuttal Ms. Waldron BENCH TRIAL 
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Case No: 040604864 
Date: Mar 11, 2005 
Court finds: Petition on suspension is denied 
Dated this 
THOMAS* L KA1 
District Court Judge 
